On its face, France and India do not have much in common. France is a NATO ally; India has remained outside any alliance system. France had numerous colonies around the world and maintains relations with many of them since they achieved independence. India was not one of those countries — it was the jewel in the British crown.
Yet both states have a common self-perception as independent poles in a multipolar world.
Despite its membership of NATO, France's long-standing refusal to join NATO's nuclear planning group reflects both its determination to maintain the independence of its nuclear deterrent and policy of what president Emmanuel Macron calls "strategic autonomy." And he is extending a French nuclear umbrella to other European states.
India, like France, is a nuclear power. It too has long pursued an independent national security policy. New Delhi did have close military and economic relations with the Soviet Union and still is a major purchaser of Russian oil. Nevertheless, the former leader of the non-aligned group of nations has no formal alliances and does not seek any.
Although France and India have maintained good relations since India achieved independence in 1947, their ties reached a turning point in 1998. That was when India conducted five nuclear tests and Washington issued sanctions against India. France did not. Indeed, France upgraded its strategic relationship with India that year.
Since the turn of the century, France and India have increasingly strengthened their technological, economic and especially military relations. Apart from counterpart visits by leading military and civilian officials, as well as naval visits, the two countries have conducted bilateral naval exercises since 2001; air force exercises since 2003; army exercises since 2011. India has also participated in the French-led multinational Orion exercises.
India has been a market for French armaments. These include India's 2016 purchase of 36 Rafale aircraft; its 2025 acquisition of 26 Rafale-M fighters for its aircraft carriers; and a 2026 additional purchase of 114 Rafale fighters. In addition, in 2005 India purchased designs for six French Scorpene submarines that it built domestically. India has recently ordered three more submarines from France.
Last year the French Directorate General of Armaments and the Indian DefenseResearch and Development Organization signed a broad-based agreement to deepen their collaboration. This included, among other areas, "aeronautical platforms, unmanned vehicles, advanced materials… cyber security, artificial intelligence ... advanced sensors ... [and] underwater technologies." The agreement built upon a long-term strategic plan that the two countries formulated in 2023, termed Horizon 2047.
Finally, after an exchange of visits by French president Emmanuel Macron and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and on the recommendation of India's parliamentary standing committee on defense, New Delhi and Paris began discussions last month on Indian participation in the French Future Combat Air System that will develop a sixth generation fighter.
In contrast with their deepening mutual relations, both countries not only have had a historically uneasy relationship with Washington, but they also have a common apprehension about the direction that American national security and economic policies have taken. France, as a member of the European Union, constantly lives under the shadow of new American tariffs imposed on EU products, or those that it produces on its own.
For example, in June, President Trump threatened to hit the French wine industry with a 100 percent tariff if it did not drop its digital services tax on American technology companies. Whether he will make good on that threat is unclear, but French apprehension should come as no surprise.
India also faces the threat of American tariffs. In early September the Senate passed the Lindsey Graham Sanctioning Russia Act that imposes a 100 percent tariff on the five leading importers of Russian oil. India is one of them. The legislation is stalled in the House, but it could pass during the lame-duck period after the November elections.
Both countries also have recent grievances regarding American policies. France lost its sale of Barracuda submarines to Australia because of the AUKUS agreement, which provided for a British-American solution to Canberra's requirement for new submarines. India, ever suspicious of Pakistan, has resented Washington's reliance upon Islamabad as a go-between in Washington's on-again off-again negotiations with Iran.
Like other states, notably in the Middle East, Paris and New Delhi are jointly hedging their bets against what they perceive might be future American policies. That is not an outcome that will benefit the U.S. France's policy of extending its deterrent umbrella should complement the American deterrent, not replace it.
As an increasingly powerful player in Asia, India should work alongside, rather than apart from, Washington's efforts to deter an increasingly aggressive China. There is much to be said for the blossoming French-Indian partnership, but it should not come about because of a loss of faith in American reliability.
Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.
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