According to the sailors, Hamas is attempting to rebuild its naval capabilities from the ruins, developing low-tech methods using basic rowboats and paddles.
Israel's Navy has implemented sweeping structural changes since the October 7 massacre, rebuilding its coastal defense system into a multi-layered "Iron Wall" along the Gaza Strip's coastline.
In-depth investigations of the October 7 massacre highlighted severe gaps and demanded fundamental changes. Against a creative, constantly adapting enemy that deploys divers, underwater craft, fast boats, drones, and seemingly innocent fishing vessels, rigid thinking risks another catastrophe.
Navy Commander Vice Admiral David Salama initiated a series of operational changes, which current Navy Commander Rear Admiral Eyal Harel accelerated, understanding that effective defense requires learning on the fly.
To systematically eliminate Hamas's naval capabilities and prevent future amphibious, subnautical, or drone-based infiltrations into Israeli territory, they've deployed upgraded fast patrol boats, integrated drone surveillance and joint intelligence, and mandated a strict zero-tolerance engagement policy.
The threat of a sea-based raid - alongside the use of drones, motorized paragliders, and submersibles - remains a constant danger. Although the Navy operates aggressively to neutralize threats early, and Hamas's motorized vessels have vanished from the area, field commanders refuse to rest on their laurels.
Commanders of the "Knights of the Gulf" company slowed the Shaldag Mark V patrol boat off Gaza's port along the city's coast. What was once a bustling, round-the-clock hub with hundreds of vessels that challenged and surprised the Navy on October 7 is now deserted.
"There are no motorized vessels left; look," explained the senior officer aboard, with the ruins of the city visible in the background. From the moment we left port toward Gaza, almost every command given over the radio was about scanning the water for threats.
The memory of the October 7 massacre hangs heavily in the air. That Saturday morning, at 6:29 AM, red alert sirens sounded.
Under cover of rocket and mortar fire, elite Nukhba naval forces from Hamas's military wing launched seven boats toward Israel. Dozens of beachgoers rushed to find shelter - some ran to public bomb shelters, others to beach restrooms.
With remarkable sharpness against heavy odds, Navy sailors managed to strike five boats and eliminate 20 terrorists, but the balance of force was complex. Two boats reached the shore carrying 18 heavily armed Nukhba fighters who proceeded to predetermined targets - meticulously planned right under the nose of Israeli intelligence and the wider IDF.
The minutes that followed marked the start of a massive systemic failure.
As a primary, prominent measure, the Navy, Shin Bet, and Military Intelligence joined forces to systematically degrade Hamas and Islamic Jihad's maritime capabilities.
This offensive push recently received significant momentum with the appointment of Rear-Admiral A., former commander of Shayetet 13 (Naval Commandos), as head of the Intelligence Directorate's Operations Division - an officer raised in the naval arena who fully understands maritime threats and the necessary intelligence-gathering envelope.
Ashdod Naval Base Commander Captain A. deepened the analysis and debriefs, restructuring the entire sector.
In cooperation with ground forces, they established multi-layered defensive rings across sea, air, and land to back each other up and ensure continuous surveillance and interception capabilities. As part of the upgraded defenses, forces were positioned to act as a clear, aggressive buffer against sudden threats.
"Look to your left now," the senior officer said. "See those quad bikes speeding south? That's a new unit created after October 7 to counter beach infiltrations - a backstop in case we fail to stop terrorists at sea or during their transition to land."
Sailors from the "Knights of the Gulf" company call the new system an "Iron Wall."
It relies on a tight integration of advanced technology and force concentration across a broad, heavily monitored border zone where access is completely restricted - a far cry from the past, when Hamas terrorists disguised as fishermen constantly challenged forces, and some commanders enforced overly cautious rules of engagement. Hamas exploited that crack in the wall to lull the IDF into a false sense of security.
The new Shaldag vessel continued south toward the Egyptian border, with Khan Younis soon visible in the distance. The sheer scale of destruction was striking even from the sea. As they operate, the crew constantly analyzes threats in all sectors, above and below ground, including divers who could launch under cover of bad weather.
"That's why anyone approaching the shoreline with diving equipment sets off an immediate red flag. It was never like this before," explained one officer from the squadron.
He added, "Everyone on this boat knows that the moment a diver emerges from the sea onto land, he's heavy and slow to organize. It takes him about 40 seconds to get his bearings. In that window, we have to strike him with precision from the sea. We train on this repeatedly to stay sharp. One of the core changes to prevent that scenario is joint-service integration. A Zik drone operator sees what the Shaldag sees, along with ground observation and drones - and vice versa. Everyone sees everything."
The engine roar of the Shaldag Mark V tells the full story.
It is longer than the older model, with upgraded, classified surveillance and firepower capabilities, along with extended sea endurance and range. "In short - a monster of a vessel that maneuvers rapidly to its target," explained an officer.
Suddenly, bursts of gunfire echoed from the starboard side. "We identified a suspicious object. To rule out an IED meant to hit us or wash ashore in Israel, we simply shoot at it. It could just be a loose fishing trap floating up from the seabed... we take zero risks."
According to the sailors, Hamas is attempting to rebuild its naval capabilities from the ruins, developing low-tech methods using basic rowboats and paddles.
"We expect them to try to challenge us in every way, including surprises," explained a young officer, pointing to a drone taking off from the deck. "We have zero patience for provocations or boundary violations," he clarified. "See this drone? It can broadcast announcements, drop munitions, or strike directly - the team is fully trained for every scenario."
An additional concern stems from Hamas's high motivation to smuggle weaponry from the Sinai into the Gaza Strip. Beyond acknowledging professional cooperation with the Egyptian military, officers declined to elaborate. The altitude gauge and radar on the Shaldag's control room monitors soon warned of their proximity to the pier.
This process illustrates precisely what Dr. Zvi Lanir warned about in his book Fundamental Surprise regarding the "illusion of repair" after a major crisis: the trap of dumping resources into fixing secondary systems - like upgrading naval gear and technology - instead of fundamentally questioning the high command's underlying assumptions.
A real-world test of this mindset didn't take long. Last Friday, the IDF got a stark reminder of just how fragile the coastal sector and overall security setup remain when an alarm tripped at Kibbutz Zikim near the beach.
At 11:35 PM on Friday - typically Southern Command's lowest state of readiness, with some commanders off for the weekend - a sensor flagged a disturbance along fence section 30 near the farm area. A security guard rushed to the spot, saw no damage other than two jackals nearby, decided that explained it, and gave the all-clear.
A few minutes later, a second guard on a routine perimeter sweep found a clean square cut through the fence near the cowshed and supply yard. He alerted the kibbutz security chief, who immediately escalated to the highest threat level, declaring a full terrorist infiltration.
The kibbutz rapid-response team mobilized, and the Northern Brigade under Captain O. triggered full emergency protocols, calling in a Zik drone overhead. The debrief showed that a unit led by a deputy battalion commander arrived within minutes. Shortly after, an engineering reserve force pulled up in two Humvees alongside the battalion commander's mobile command post, placing nearly 50 armed troops inside the kibbutz - a rapid response by any standard.
Responders quickly realized the fence was likely cut to steal valuable copper wiring, lowering fears of an attack. Still, residents stayed locked in their safe rooms as reinforcements arrived, including a tracker and containment units led by the deputy brigade commander. Air Force personnel coordinated directly with the kibbutz security chief to maintain real-time situational awareness.
At the same time, a senior Southern Command official noted that multiple drones swept the surrounding area to rule out any remaining threats. The sector intelligence commander redirected surveillance toward Zikim, running manual sweeps and checking the post-October 7 radar network. Within minutes, the data confirmed no landings from the sea or crossings at the nearby Shikma Stream.
The debrief established that within 40 minutes, 140 troops, police officers, and Border Police were on site, working out of a joint command post with local security officials. Brigade Commander Captain O. had ordered forces to treat the event as a hostile attack until proven otherwise.
Even so, within 28 minutes of the first alert, Southern Command knew with high confidence that this was a routine theft attempt - confirming no entry into the kibbutz, as no footprints crossed past the cut fence.
In the aftermath, questions emerged over why the kibbutz PA system wasn't used to warn residents faster, and why a quick headcount wasn't ordered immediately. A senior official close to the investigation countered that the response was based on a recent brigade drill simulating multi-point infiltrations in Sderot and Netiv HaAsara, executed alongside Israel Police.
Still, he acknowledged that inter-agency coordination must become even tighter and faster to seal operational gaps.
Field commanders recognize that they must operate on the assumption that the enemy retains hidden diving and asymmetric capabilities. They remain on high alert for the toughest scenario: adverse weather at the most unexpected hour - the ultimate test for the new multi-layered defense system.