Vladmir Putin knows he has a problem. The war is costing Russia about $290 billion per year. Russia is losing 30,000 troops a month. Its advance is not just stalling but also reversing in some places. And the Russian public is feeling the cost of war in more tangible ways. Ukrainian drones hit a St. Petersburg oil terminal and nearby port in July of this year. On top of that in late 2025, Russia announced that value added taxes were going up to 22%, with food prices surging up 18% in 2026 as well.
Putin is so desperate that he started to rely on troops from North Korea, one of the poorest countries in the world. South Korea's Defence Intelligence Agency estimates that North Korea has sent more than 16,000 personnel to Russia since October of 2024 and supplied it with more than 15 million artillery rounds. Pyongyang has also provided Russia with dozens of KN-23 and KN-24 missiles.
Ukraine has suggested that up to another 50,000 North Korean soldiers could eventually be deployed, something that Kim Jong Un's sister Kim Yo Jong dismissed as "completely groundless."
But how is this growing closeness between Russia and North Korea being perceived by China? Over the past 18 months Russia and North Korea have had 23 high level visits involving their ministers, compared to only eight between China and North Korea.
China's main worry is that deeper ties between Russia and North Korea could increase regional instability and damage China's global reputation. Chinese leader Xi Jinping is also concerned that growing ties between Putin and Kim Jong Un will reduce Xi's leverage over Pyongyang. Official and academic Chinese sources have stressed that Beijing has little interest in a deep trilateral military alignment involving China, North Korea and Russia. While China recognizes that broader Russia-North Korea cooperation increases pressure on the US and other Western allies, it remains uninterested in endorsing a formalized trilateral alignment that would constrain Beijing's strategic goals.
In reality, Russia's relationship with North Korea is entirely transactional. North Korea has happily come through when Russia needed it, but the relationship is not exactly mutual. In 2014, North Korea was among the few countries to recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea, hoping that it would receive economic benefits from Russia in return. This never materialized, however. Bilateral trade between North Korea and Russia remained very limited, only $42 million in 2020, with North Korea ranked as Russia 139th biggest trading partner.
Today North Korea earns between $7.7 billion and $14.4 billion from the sale of munitions and the deployment of North Korean troops in Russia. North Korea has also benefited from Russia's transfer of sensitive technologies such as naval reactors for nuclear-powered submarines, air defence systems and drone technology. Additionally, with Russia's help North Korea could gain access to autonomous AI-enabled and jet powered drones.
China is increasingly concerned that access to these types of weapons will embolden North Korea, creating greater instability in the region. With Russian help, North Korea's nuclear program and space assets are accelerating, emboldening Kim Jon Un.
China is also worried that as North Korea becomes more powerful and assertive due its closer ties with Russia, its provocations and miscalculations could prompt closer security cooperation between the US, South Korea and Japan, and motivate South Korea and Japan to pursue nuclear weapons. China also does not want a regional conflict to develop which could lead to a refugee crisis, north of the Yalu River that divides North Korea and China.
The historical relationship between China and North Korea has been fraught with competition, tension, derision and a profound sense of mistrust rather than mutual respect. Beijing only wants North Korea to be more stable, but not necessarily more powerful. If at best North Korea is seen as a little brother to China, it is regarded as a delinquent one, incapable of doing anything sensible.
This comes at a time when the Chinese public, as expressed through social media posts, is actively hostile towards North Korea, viewing it as an ungrateful troublemaker. Chinese citizens on social media have given Kim unflattering nicknames, including "'Fatty Kim the Third" which the Chinese government had to censor. Chinese web users in an online survey have revealed that many Chinese have felt cold towards North Korea for years.
The Chinese public feels much differently towards Russia. Chinese social media users have shown unquestionable support towards Russia in the war in Ukraine, claiming that "Russia must win." Putin is portrayed as wise, kind and well-meaning by the Chinese media, while also depicted as an invincible strongman. The Russian people are characterized positively as well, as courageous and admirable. Ultimately, the Chinese see Russia as a strategic ally and an important bulwark against the aggressive West. The same can't be said for North Korea.
While Moscow appears to be cozy with Pyongyang, this is mostly a temporary marriage of convenience with not a lot of love from Russians towards North Korea. Russians are warming to North Korea only slightly, with just one-third of the Russian public seeing North Korea as a close ally in 2026—albeit this is a huge increase from 2021 when it was only 3% according to the independent Levada Centre.
For China, this burgeoning relationship between North Korea and Russia presents more challenges than opportunities. As Moscow deepens its military and strategic ties with Pyongyang, Beijing risks losing some of its leverage over North Korea while facing a more unpredictable neighbor on its doorstep. What may appear to be a useful partnership for Moscow is increasingly uncomfortable for Beijing.
This article was originally published on Forbes.com