Ronen Bar warned Netanyahu of a possible Hamas "earthquake" before October 7 and urged the prime minister to approve strikes on the group's senior leadership.
Less than a week before the October 7 attack, then Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 1, 2023, and recommended carrying out a targeted assassination of Hamas leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar, along with a series of additional assassinations targeting senior figures in the organization.
According to a security source, Bar told Netanyahu that the Shin Bet had identified that Hamas was "preparing something extreme," and also used the term "earthquake" during the conversation. The source confirmed that the information was presented to the prime minister and that the recommendation to act against Sinwar and other senior Hamas officials was put before him, but Netanyahu did not accept it. "The reports that have emerged recently on this matter are accurate," the security source said.
The account takes on additional significance in light of Haaretz's recent report alleging that UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed also warned Netanyahu, about a week and a half before the attack, that Sinwar was planning a significant move against Israel.
According to the investigation, MBZ called Netanyahu from the presidential palace in Abu Dhabi, and the two spoke for about 45 minutes. During the conversation, the UAE president warned that Sinwar was preparing for a major move that could lead to bloodshed, destabilize the region, and even harm the Abraham Accords.
President Isaac Herzog, who maintains close relations with MBZ, told Haaretz that the UAE president had already been concerned about the situation before the war. "He spoke to me about it a lot in the months before the war," he said.
According to the investigation, MBZ's source was a close adviser, a Palestinian who had emigrated from Gaza to Abu Dhabi years earlier and maintained contacts in the Strip. The adviser said that bin Zayed warned Netanyahu that Israel needed to prepare. "The emir explained that, in his assessment, Sinwar was preparing for a significant event. He told Netanyahu that Israel would be better off being prepared."
At the same time, MBZ recommended pursuing an economic solution in Gaza and reducing tensions in the West Bank in an effort to prevent further deterioration. According to the report, Netanyahu received the warning relatively calmly and said that, in his assessment, Hamas intended to act specifically in the West Bank. He also reassured MBZ that Israel was prepared for any scenario.
MBZ later shared his concern that "something is about to explode" with then CIA director William Burns. However, according to the same report, the warning delivered by the UAE president to Netanyahu was not brought to the attention of the heads of Israel's security establishment. The heads of the Shin Bet and Mossad, as well as the IDF chief of staff, were unaware of the warning the prime minister had received.
Meanwhile, the security establishment rejects the claim that the outcome could necessarily have been changed if the prime minister or defense minister had received an update during the night between October 6 and 7.
According to security officials, the intelligence picture available to the Shin Bet and Military Intelligence that night was partial and did not provide sufficient clarity about Hamas's offensive intentions. Some of the information, they said, was even consistent with signs of continued routine inside Gaza and did not clearly indicate that a large-scale attack was about to be launched within hours.
The security establishment maintains that even if Netanyahu or the defense minister had become involved at that stage, convening an assessment at the political level, building an intelligence picture and making decisions would have taken enough time that the discussion itself would have come close to the time the attack began.
A security source familiar with the events of that night rejected Netanyahu's version, according to which he would have acted in a way that changed the situation on the ground had he received an update during the night.
According to the officials, the intelligence available at the time did not provide a clear picture that Hamas intended to launch a comprehensive attack. They also said the remaining timeframe was too short for the IDF to move significant forces into position or launch a disruption operation that could have prevented the attack.